Many developed countries, e.g. the UK, Germany, and Sweden, use or have used settlement policies to direct the inflow of new immigrants away from immigrant dense metropolitan areas. We evaluate a reform of Swedish immigration policy that featured dispersion of refugee immigrants across the country, but also a change in the approach to labor market integration. We focus exclusively on how immigrants fared because of the policy. The results indicate that immigrants experienced fairly substantial long run losses because of the policy. We also find that only a smaller share of this effect was associated with the dispersion of immigrants across regions. The larger share of the impact appears to stem from a common component that affected immigrants regardless of where they were located. Our somewhat speculative reading of this result is that it can be traced to a shift in emphasis of integration policy from a policy focusing on labor market assimilation to one of income support.
Introduction
The past couple of decades have seen an acceleration of immigration to developed countries. Concomitantly, there has been a shift in the ethnic composition of the immigrant inflow and an associated decline in the labor market performance of recently arrived immigrants compared to natives in these countries. These developments have put immigration policies high on the political agenda.
One kind of immigration policy imposes restrictions on where newly arrived immigrants can settle. We call such policies settlement policies. Many countries practice (or have practiced) settlement policies; examples include the UK, Germany, and Sweden. 1 Under the new UK Asylum and Immigration Bill, refugee immigrants are placed outside London and Southeast England -the two regions where most previous immigrants reside.
Germany imposes severe restrictions on where refugee immigrants can settle: unless having found a paid job, people must stay in a part of the country assigned by the government. In Denmark as well as the Netherlands, authorities try to disperse immigrants by obliging all municipalities to provide dwellings for a certain number of refugees (Dutch Refugee Council, 1999) . In addition, local dispersal policies have been used within European metropolitan areas (Musterd et al., 2000) . Sweden is another example, where a new system for refugee immigrant reception was introduced in the mid 1980s. One aspect of the system was that asylum seekers were placed in regions outside the metropolitan areas to a greater extent. Thus, settlement policies are commonly employed, and a vital ingredient of the policies is the attempt to reduce immigrant concentration in big city areas.
Broadly, two arguments have been put forward to rationalize the placement of new immigrants outside immigrant dense regions. The first argument is based on the idea that living in immigrant enclaves stalls immigrant assimilation by decreasing the rate at which immigrants acquire skills specific to the host country. The second argument is based on the perception that immigrants impose a fiscal and social burden on the host 1 Until the last few years, Israeli authorities located immigrants outside the major cities. Recently the policy has changed from one of deliberate placement to one of encouragement to settle in development towns; see Hiltermann (1991) for details on the Israel policy toward Russian immigrants. US immigration authorities distribute refugees through private organizations that arrange housing; the dispersion of immigrants across the US is not an explicit objective, however (Borjas, 2000a) . Belgium is another country where some kind of restrictions are imposed on the residence of new immigrants.
regions. Placing immigrants outside the major cities thus distributes the perceived cost more equally across the host country.
In this paper we examine the versatility of the first type of argument. In particular we ask the question: How did the Swedish settlement policy affect the economic outcomes of the immigrants subjected to the policy? The Swedish experience may be instructive for countries pursuing, or thinking of implementing, similar kinds of policies.
Immigrant enclaves are not necessarily harmful for immigrants living there. The enclave may present the immigrant with more opportunities for gainful "trade" in the goods and labor markets; e.g. Lazear (1999) . Also, ethnic neighborhoods may constitute an environment where the immigrant is exposed to less discrimination. Moreover, an ethnic "network" may improve labor market outcomes by providing information on job opportunities. Of course, "network effects" may also operate in the opposite direction by, e.g., disseminating information on welfare use; see Bertrand et al. (2000) . One can also tell stories based on human capital externalities. According to one version, the quality of the enclave (the average stock of human capital) determines whether segregation is good or bad; e.g. Borjas (1998) . In sum, the effect of living in an immigrant dense region is a priori ambiguous.
Many empirical studies find a negative association between the economic outcomes of ethnic minorities and neighborhood characteristics such as segregation, immigrant density or ethnic concentration; see Kain (1992) and Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1998) for surveys. Whether these estimates should be treated as causal is another issue, since the majority of these studies take local characteristics as exogenous. Such an approach is, of course, plagued by Tiebout sorting bias. In related work we have examined the severity of this problem; see Edin et al. (2000a) . 2 We used the settlement policy as an exogenous source of variation arguing that initial placements were independent of unobserved individual characteristics. We found that there was a substantial downward bias in estimates that do not account for sorting; in fact, estimates that were free of sorting bias suggested that an increase in ethnic concentration improved the labor market outcomes for refugee immigrants. Thus, from an empirical point of view, the effects of redirecting the inflow of immigrants away from enclaves are far from clear-cut.
For a settlement policy to have real effects in the long run, the long-run distribution of immigrants in the receiving country must be affected. The Swedish policy had real consequences for immigrant location, as illustrated in Figure 1 . It plots the share of the immigrant inflow and stock residing in Stockholm and the North of Sweden respectively.
As indicated by the vertical dashed lines, the policy was viable between 1985 and 1991.
Prior to 1985, most immigrants were essentially free to choose a region of residence. In the mid 1980s there was a drastic shift of the inflow towards the North. More importantly, the stocks were also affected. The share of this group of immigrants living in the north of Notes: "Stockholm" refers to the county of Stockholm, "North" to the six northernmost counties of Sweden. Own calculations using the LINDA immigrant sample.
There was more to the policy shift than inducing an increase in the dispersion of immigrants in Sweden. Prior to 1985, the integration of refugee immigrants had a direct connection to labor market policy since handling refugee issues was the responsibility of the Labor Market Board. This link was broken in 1985, when the Immigration Board became responsible for refugees. One of the implemented changes was that immigrants were placed on welfare for an introductory period of about 18 months. 3 Thus, it seems that the new policy effectively shifted the focus from labor market integration to income support. Given that there were two facets of the policy shift, we try to decompose the effects of the shift into its component parts: one associated with redirecting the inflow of immigrants from immigrant dense regions; and another which we interpret as being associated with the shift in the approach to integration policy.
Our results can briefly be summarized as follows. The overall effect of the policy was that immigrants suffered fairly substantial long-run earnings losses. Among those with earnings, we estimate an earnings loss of about 25 percent for those subjected to the policy. In addition, idleness increased by one third, and welfare receipt by approximately 40 percent. The decomposition analysis suggests that the bulk of this loss is due to the shift in the approach to integration policies. With respect to the settlement policy per se, we find that had individuals stayed on in the assigned municipalities their labor market prospects would have been decidedly worse. However, in the longer run individuals moved out of regions with bad employment prospects, so that the initial effects were undone.
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the institutional setting. In section 3, we present the evaluation framework. We think of an individual's outcome as being determined by a common effect and an effect derived from the characteristics of the region. Section 4 turns to the empirical analyses. We use longitudinal micro data derived from the database LINDA (see Edin and Fredriksson, 2000) and focus on three outcomes: earnings, idleness, and welfare dependency. We begin by estimating the overall effect of the policy without conditioning on regional characteristics. We then estimate the causal effect of regional characteristics, by using the quasi-experiment provided by the assignment policy. These estimates allow us to get at the component of the policy stemming from the fact that individuals were exposed to different regional environments. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.
The institutional setting
This section has two objectives. First, we describe the major institutional changes that were implemented in 1985 when the settlement policy was introduced. Second, we ask the question: Can we regard the settlement policy as a natural experiment?
An overview 4
Prior to 1985, the Swedish Labor Market Board handled refugee issues. Presumably this was a remnant from the time when most immigrants entered Sweden for labor market reasons. Nonetheless, this state of affairs meant that there was a natural focus on labor market integration and immigration policy was linked to labor market policy.
Immigration for labor market reasons from non-Nordic countries virtually ceased in the mid 1970s. Since then immigration from these countries is mainly for political reasons.
Partly as a consequence of this change, the responsibility for handling refugee issues was transferred to the Swedish Immigration Board; formally the change took place in 1985, but there was a trial period in the autumn of 1984.
Before the reform, a majority of refugee immigrants traveled directly to a municipality and applied for asylum there. Remaining refugee immigrants were so called quota refugees who stayed in centers before moving to a municipality. 5 The Labor Market Board was responsible for organizing housing (if necessary) and assisting refugees in finding suitable training or employment. It seems that all refugee immigrants could influence the choice of initial residence; in any case, a vast majority arrived in the regions of Stockholm, Göteborg or Malmö (Ministry of Labor, 1981 Labor, , 1983 .
After the reform, all refugee immigrants, apart from reunification immigrants, were subjected to the settlement policy. The Immigration Board assigned immigrants to a municipality of residence. Municipal authorities, in turn, assigned immigrants to an 4 This section draws primarily on The Committee on Immigration Policy (1996) and The Immigration Board (1997) . 5 The absolute number of quota refugees was roughly constant during the 1980s; thus, its share of the total refugee inflow decreased when immigration rose. In the fiscal year 1982/83, quota refugees made up 25% of the inflow (Ministry of Labor, 1983) ; in 1987 their share of the inflow had declined to 10%.
apartment. Reception in the municipalities was regulated in agreements between the Board and the municipality in question.
At first the intention was to sign contracts with 60 municipalities (out of Sweden's 284 municipalities) that had suitable characteristics for reception, such as educational and labor market opportunities. Due to the increasing number of asylum seekers in the second half of the 1980s, a larger number of municipalities became involved; in 1989, 277 out of Sweden's 284 municipalities participated. The factors that were supposed to govern placement were abandoned from the start. Instead, the availability of housing was the deciding factor.
Employment opportunities were scant in the majority of municipalities that became involved in asylum reception. To rationalize placement in regions with poor employment prospects, the Immigration Board divided the integration process into two periods: an introductory period lasting for 18 months when the immigrant participated in Swedish courses and lived off welfare; 6 after the introductory period integration into the labor market commenced.
The move to a strict settlement policy was a reaction to the concentration of immigrants to large cities that had taken place. The immigrants were to stay in the assigned municipalities during the entire introductory period. However, there were no restrictions against relocating if individuals could find a place on their own. The only real cost to the immigrant consisted of a wait for a new place in a language course. Receipt of welfare was not conditional on residing in the assigned municipality and the central government reimbursed the local governments for their welfare expenditures. From 1985 through 1990, municipalities were reimbursed for their actual expenditures, so there was little incentive for local governments to pursue a policy that produced early assimilation into employment. This changed in 1991 when municipalities were given a standard amount per refugee.
Formally, the policy of assigning refugees to municipalities was in place from 1985 to 1994. In 1994, a new law was passed that gave immigrants the right to choose the initial place of residence provided that they could find an apartment on their own. 7 However, the strictness of the placement policy gradually eroded during 1992-94, when there was an immigration peak caused by the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The post-1991 period is less attractive for our purposes, since it contained larger degrees of freedom for the individual immigrant to choose the initial place of residence.
The strictest application of the assignment policy was between 1987 and 1991. In 1988, a new law was passed which required "extraordinary reasons" for all others than family members to get the right to stay in a municipality instead of a refugee center while waiting for a residence permit. 8 In effect, it seems that the law formalized a stricter practice, which had been introduced in 1987. During 1987-91, the placement rate, i.e. the fraction of refugee immigrants assigned an initial municipality of residence by the Immigration Board, was close to 90 percent.
The municipal placement policy is an obvious difference between the pre-and postreform periods. Other differences may be harder to pinpoint, but are important for understanding the overall effect of the program. 9 Our reading of the facts is that the reform shifted the policy focus away from labor market assimilation to an increased reliance on income support. Before the reform, employment officers were responsible for the arrangements concerning housing, education, and jobs. After the reform, "refugee coordinators", employed by the municipalities, handled these responsibilities. The direct link to the employment offices providing job search assistance, subsidized employment, or training programs were thus broken. In practice, there was insufficient cooperation between the coordinators and the employment offices. Partly as a result of this, the transition from basic language training, via additional courses in Swedish, to labor market training or a job, became less smooth and contained longer spells of inactivity. In a similar vein, the integration into the labor market was postponed relative to the time of arrival. Individuals arriving after the reform were granted (or subjected to) a long initial period (at least 18 months) of welfare receipt. This period was much shorter for 7 From then on more than 50 percent of the immigrants have used this opportunity. The Immigration Board has placed the remainder of the immigrants. 8 This was a tightening of regulations in the following sense. Prior to the change, refugees could stay in a municipality of their own choice while waiting for a residence permit and, in general, the chance of being assigned the municipality of residence was greater than being assigned another municipality. 9 Our information about the pre-reform period comes mainly from Ministry of Labor (1981 Labor ( , 1983 ) and officials at the Immigration Board.
immigrants arriving in previous years: quota refugees spent 4-6 months in the center before moving to a municipality to work or participate in labor market training;
immigrants who had traveled directly to a municipality waited 2-3 months after receiving their residence permit before moving on to work or training. 10 To conclude, we think it is fair to say that the reform brought two major changes: the placement policy where the government assigned the initial place of residence, and a shift in focus away from labor market integration in favor of income support.
2.2 Can the settlement policy be regarded as a natural experiment?
In a companion paper (see Edin et al. (2000a) ) we argued that the settlement policy provides an exogenous source of variation that identifies the causal effect of regional characteristics.
If the policy is to provide a quasi-experiment, actual placement should be independent of any unobservable characteristics in the outcome equations. To what extent is this true?
Were some individuals more likely placed than others? To answer these questions we interviewed placement officers and other officials of the Immigration Board. The following is a description of the practical implementation of the policy.
An asylum seeker was placed in a refugee center while waiting for a decision from the immigration authorities. Refugee centers were distributed all over Sweden, and the port of entry did not influence to which center the individual was directed.
There was a long wait for a residence permit. The mean duration between entry into Sweden and the receipt of a permit (conditional on receipt) varied between 3 and 12 months during 1987-91; see Rooth (1999) . There was a much shorter wait for a municipal placement after receiving the permit, partly because placement officers had explicit goals in terms of the duration of this spell.
When it came to the municipal placement, weight was given to immigrant preferences.
Most immigrants, of course, applied for residence in the traditional immigrant cities of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. There were very few apartment vacancies in these locations, however, in particular during the second half of the 1980s when the housing 10 Quota refugees living in centers did not receive individual social assistance; instead, the Labor Market Board paid for costs of living. Immigrants living outside the centers received social assistance from the municipalities. The central government then reimbursed municipalities for the amount paid plus a standard addition of 25 percent of the amount to cover costs for public services. market was booming. When the number of applicants exceeded the number of available slots, municipal officers selected the "best" immigrants. Notice that there was no interaction between municipal officers and refugees. The selection was, hence, purely in terms of observable characteristics; language, formal qualifications, and family size seem to have been the governing criteria. When the municipalities could "cream-skim", they selected highly educated individuals and individuals that spoke the same language as some members of the resident immigrant stock. Single individuals were particularly difficult to place, since small apartments were extremely scarce.
On the basis of the above description, we think that it is realistic to treat the municipal assignment as exogenous with respect to the random components of the outcomes of interest, conditional on observed characteristics. For highly qualified individuals this assumption can potentially be problematic. Cream-skimming on the part of municipal officers suggests that high-skilled may have been able to realize their preferred option. 11
The evaluation framework
In order to set the stage for the empirical analysis, we devote this section to making clear what we can estimate and the kind of restrictions that are necessary to estimating the parameters of interest. The basic problem is that we think that location matters for outcomes, but due to sorting we cannot consistently estimate the impact of regional characteristics. In this section we therefore ask two questions. What does an estimate of the overall effect of the policy -one derived without conditioning on regional characteristics -actually measure? Which restrictions must be satisfied for this estimate to be meaningful?
We are also interested in decomposing the estimate of the overall effect of the policy.
Our basic approach is to combine a difference-in-difference estimate of the overall effect with an estimate of the distribution effect. The distribution effect relates to the fact that immigrant arrival cohorts were subjected to different regional environments because of the placement policy. The residual in this decomposition is by construction the common effect of the policy. The distribution component can be estimated for the refugees arriving during the strict settlement policy since the initial placement of these individuals provides exogenous variation that identifies the effects of regional characteristics. Consider a simple structural earnings equation for an immigrant i in arrival cohort
for those who arrived during the strict placement policy)
where τ α i denotes unobservable ability relative to the mean outcome (
The estimation of equation (1) is complicated by the fact that individuals choose where to reside. In Edin et al. (2000a) , we considered the sorting bias that may arise in this setting.
In the simple framework we are examining here, the bias arises to the extent that there is a covariance between τ α i and regional characteristics τ z . To be concrete, suppose for the moment that τ z reflects immigrant density; then, if high ability individuals choose to live outside immigrant enclaves, the OLS estimate of m β is biased downwards -and vice versa.
Let us pool the two cross sections by defining the dummy variable p such that 1
. If we have some exogenous variation identifying the coefficients on d, and assuming that the two cohorts are generically of equal mean
), one can in principle use equation (2) The simple before-and-after estimator outlined in (2) rests on the implausible assumption that there are no time effects. This is a particularly untenable assumption
given the time period that we are considering. We measure the outcomes in 1995-97 for those subjected to the policy, and in 1989-91 for pre-reform immigrants. In the beginning of the 1990s the unemployment rate in Sweden skyrocketed from less than 2 percent in 1989 to over 9 percent in 1993. Suppose that there exists a proper comparison group (superindexed c) in the sense that the time effect is the same for this group as for refugee immigrants, and assume for now that there is no change in mean unobservable ability over time. Define a dummy m equaling unity if the individual is a refugee immigrant and pool the two groups into a single regression
The crucial parameter in (3) is the coefficient on 
where ∆ is the difference operator, and Equation (4) is written on a form that separates the components of interest from the ones we want to eliminate by imposing restrictions and choosing a suitable comparison group. It is clear that the first and the second component are key elements of the policy change. As we have argued, there was a common component in the policy shift; the first component, which simply equals π in equation (3), measures this effect. Also, there was a regional dimension to the policy since immigrants were dispersed across different regions -this distribution effect is measured by the second component in equation (4). We refer to the sum of the common and distribution effect as the overall effect of the policy. The remaining components should not be attributed to the policy. 13 In the following proposition, we detail the conditions that the comparison group must satisfy in order for the "raw" difference-in-difference estimator ) (δ to give a sensible estimate of the overall effect of the policy. 
From a practical point of view the most important obstacles are conditions (i) and (iv).
The first condition suggests that we should look for comparison groups along the observable skill dimension. The fourth condition arises because we do not want to condition on region of residence. It may disqualify many groups as comparisons simply because we know that residence patterns among, e.g., natives and immigrants are very different. Empirically, the fourth condition is likely to be of some importance since it eliminates the influence of the fourth component in (4). We know for a fact that, e.g., the dispersion of regional unemployment increases (i.e. 0 z z p − changes) along with the overall rate of unemployment. So the time effects that render the before-and-after estimator implausible will also reduce the plausibility of estimates derived using a comparison group that does not satisfy the fourth criterion. When we return to the 13 One can also argue that part of the fifth component should be included in an evaluation of the policy success; to our minds, however, the effect of the policy on the characteristics of the region is likely to have been of minor importance.
selection of comparison groups in the next section, we mainly focus on these two conditions. However, we also discuss whether equality of the return to regional characteristics -condition (iii) -is a reasonable assumption. Moreover, in the empirical analysis we consider problems caused by differential changes in unobservable cohort quality -condition (ii).
Given that the conditions in the proposition are satisfied, we can meaningfully decompose the overall effect of the policy into a common effect π and a dispersion effect
The decomposition is made possible by the fact that the settlement policy gives exogenous variation in regions of residence that can be used to identify γ . We can thus apply an instrumental variables approach to the cohort that was subjected to the policy to estimate the coefficient on the regional dummy. It is important to realize that these estimates are free from sorting bias if one believes in the quasi-experimental nature of the data. In the next section, equation (5) and the criteria for identifying it, will guide our choice of empirical strategy and comparison group.
Empirical analysis
We begin the empirical analysis by describing the data, and the choice of counterfactual and comparison group. Then we take a brief look at the impact the reform had on the geographic distribution and internal mobility of refugee immigrants. After that we proceed to the evaluation of the reform in terms of economic outcomes of the participants.
First, we investigate the overall effect of the policy, and then we decompose this effect into a common effect and a dispersion effect.
Data and sample selection
The empirical analysis is based on data from the LINDA database. LINDA contains two panels: one of around 20 percent of the foreign-born population, and another of approximately 3 percent of the total Swedish population. The data are cross-sectionally representative. Data are available from 1960 and onwards, and are based on a combination of income tax registers, population censuses and other sources; for more details, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) .
We cannot identify refugee immigrants directly from our data. Instead we identify them by country of origin. As a general rule we include immigrants from countries that were not members of the OECD as of 1985 and countries outside Western Europe. The only exception from this rule is Turkey, which is included since it was the origin of a substantial inflow of refugee immigrants during the period. Furthermore, persons belonging to a household with either a Swedish-born grown-up or a person who immigrated in a previous year were excluded, since these individuals were likely to have immigrated as family members and, consequently, were not "treated". We also apply an age restriction and base our analysis on individuals aged 18-55 at the time of entry into Sweden. Lastly, we focus on the immigration waves during 1987-89, when placement rates were of the order of 90 percent.
The choice of counterfactual and comparison group
In order to evaluate the reform it is necessary to construct a counterfactual. For this purpose, we use individuals who are identified as refugee immigrants (according to the above criteria) during the years 1981-83.
Since we want to use the 1981/83 cohort as an approximation of the counterfactual for the 1987/89 cohort it is vital that the cohorts are similar in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. With respect to observable characteristics, there were no important differences in terms of age and gender. 14 In Tables 1 and 2 , we compare the cohorts in terms of education and ethnicity. Table 1 begins by tabulating immigrants by educational level. While about 30 percent of the "pre-program" cohort has a short high school education, the program cohort is more evenly spread out across educational levels.
To us these differences do not raise great concern, however. In fact, if we impute years of education the cohorts are very similar; the 1987/89 cohort has 0.2 additional schooling years on average.
The difference between the two cohorts in terms of ethnicity is a greater source of concern; see Table 2 . It is well known that ethnicity is an important determinant of success in the receiving country; ethnicity is important as it influences language skills and the level of formal education varies by origin country (Borjas, 1994 To us the differences in terms of region of origin seem substantial. To generate the counterfactual location distribution for the 1987/89 cohort, we reweigh observations in the 1981/83 cohort such that the distribution over region of origin conforms to the 1987/89 cohort. Whenever we talk about location differences across cohorts in the sequel, we refer to the differences between the 1987/89 cohort and the weighted 1981/83 cohort.
On the more difficult question of whether unobserved heterogeneity will bias our policy evaluation, these aggregate statistics, of course, provide limited information. However, it is reassuring that formal education is so similar across the two cohorts.
The choice of comparison group
In section 3 we identified properties that a comparison group must have to make a meaningful analysis possible. Our strategy is to consider the following comparison groups: The suitability of these groups depends on how well they conform to the conditions described in the proposition of section 3. Edin et al. (2000b) show that most of the economic assimilation of immigrants occurs within a few years after arrival. 17 Since this group has 16 We obtained the predictions by regressing the outcome variable on individual characteristics (see equation (6)) and time controls, and then predicting values using only individual variables. 17 With an assimilation measure that corresponds to this comparison (allowing assimilation to be affected by return migration), 79 percent of the earnings growth observed in the first ten years among non-OECD immigrants occurs between the first and fourth year; less than 2 percent of the growth comes between the seventh and the tenth year.
been in Sweden for a minimum of nine years before we first measure outcomes, we do not expect assimilation between 89-91 and 95-97 (when we measure outcomes) to bias the estimated time effects.
In the first panel of There are additional reasons to prefer the 1975/80 cohorts of non-OECD immigrants as the comparison. It is a priori plausible that this group best meets the third condition, i.e., there is equality of the return to local characteristics. In Edin et al. (2000a) , we find that the presence of other immigrants affects outcomes. It is quite likely that this effect is different for natives and perhaps also for OECD immigrants. Relative to OECD immigrants, there is also the advantage of having a larger number of observations; see Table A1a . The 1975/80 immigrants are therefore our primary comparison group, but in some cases we present results using also the OECD group. Some results for the native comparison groups are provided in the appendix.
18 Reweighing of the native comparison group to conform to the geographic distribution of refugee immigrants appears to be a possible alternative. Some experimentation along this line indicates that the estimated overall effect is very similar with original and reweighed data. However, since other arguments also favor the use of previous immigrant cohorts, we have not investigated this issue further. 31 Notes: Panel a shows estimates from difference-in-difference estimations of log earnings. The dependent variable is earnings eight years after immigration. In addition to the time dummies (immigration year) and interactions time*immigrant, the regression includes individual characteristics; see equation (6). Panel b shows the pre-reform geographic distribution of refugee immigrants (81/83 cohorts) and the comparison groups. To facilitate comparison across comparison groups, the location distributions for refugee immigrants are not weighted to conform to the 87/89 region-of-origin distribution.
Mobility and concentration
Since the difference in mobility is one indicator of how refugee immigrants perceived the reform, this section compares post-immigration mobility across policy regimes. We base the comparison on a simple before-and-after approach. 19 If a consequence of the government policy was that immigrants were placed in regions that they deemed inferior, we should observe greater mobility in the 1987/89 program cohort in comparison to the earlier cohort. Moreover, the economic consequences of the reform will of course depend on whether they stayed on in the assigned region.
The prediction that mobility should be greater in the program cohort is clearly contingent on immigrants being able to choose/identify their most preferred region upon arrival. There are plausible reasons why this might not be the case. For one thing, there is 19 In related research we found no obvious time effects in migration and location patterns; see Åslund (2000) .
probably genuine uncertainty about the regional variation in the pay-off to labor market skills and, hence, the answer to this question is not obvious. We start by comparing mobility across the two cohorts; see Table 4 . Eight years after the immigration year, the probability of remaining in the initial location is lower among those who were assigned a municipality by government authorities; the propensities to emigrate are roughly equal, but there is more internal mobility in the 1987/89 cohort.
However, regression based comparisons (controlling for gender, age, marital status, and region of origin) do not give strong support to changes in migration propensities (Åslund, 2000) .
Thus, post-immigration mobility seems to be high; this is true for both cohorts. To what kinds of regions did the immigrants move? We investigate this question in Table 5 . As we have noted, the policy reform was a reaction to the concentration of the foreign-born to metropolitan areas, primarily Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö. As a consequence of the reform, we should expect a shift in the initial location pattern in favor of sparsely populated areas, often located in the northern part of Sweden. Table 5 , which divides region of residence by population density, shows that the distribution of initial location across the two cohorts is radically different. There is concentration over time in both cohorts, although much more pronounced in the 1987/89 cohort. Nevertheless, there is far from total convergence of the two distributions. Thus, it seems that the reform did have lasting effects on location. A further look at the residential patterns suggests that mobility is not just from a desolated North to the populous South, but also to the regional centers in the north of Sweden. These findings show that there were no clear-cut differences in mobility between prereform immigrants and program participants. However, there was more concentration among immigrants who were assigned a municipality by government authorities. Two more things should be noted. First, the fact that there is also a lot of mobility in the cohort that was supposedly free to choose, suggests that informational problems may be of some importance. Second, even eight years after entry to Sweden, the post-reform distribution of immigrants has far from converged to the pre-reform distribution of immigrants.
The latter point implies that if there was an overall effect of the reform on economic outcomes, some of it could origin in the change in the long-run dispersion of refugee immigrants. Below, we first investigate the total effect, and then decompose it in order to determine the importance of the distribution component relative to the common component of the policy.
The overall effect of the policy
In this section, we set out to estimate the total effect of the reform on the economic outcomes of the participants. We use a difference-in-difference approach and relate the 87/89 and 81/83 immigrant cohorts to the comparison groups discussed in section 4.2. We measure outcomes eight years after immigration. The reason for choosing outcomes such a long time after immigration is that we are interested in the long-run impact on participants. Also, the policy did not aim at initial labor market success, since it prescribed language training and other introduction activities rather than immediate entry on the labor market.
The re-direction of the inflow away from big-city regions was an important part of the policy change. Partly, this was motivated by a belief that regions matter for outcomes.
However, conditioning on region of residence will potentially result in estimates suffering from sorting bias. Under the conditions outlined in the proposition we can still estimate a sensible overall program effect.
In the analysis, we focus on three measures of the outcome. The first measure is (the log of) annual earnings; the second is idleness (defined as neither having positive earnings nor being enrolled in education); the third is welfare receipt. Table A2 The difference-in-difference estimates of the total effects of the reform are derived from the following prototype specification: Tables A1a-c . Results using other comparison groups are presented in Table A3 . Table 6 shows the results for the three outcomes, using two different comparison groups. Starting with earnings, we find that the effects are quite large; according to the estimates, program participants with earnings eight years after arrival suffered approximately a 25-percent loss in earnings due to the policy.
Furthermore, the policy increased the likelihood of being idle. The estimates imply that the probability of idleness is about 5-7 percentage points higher for those subjected to the policy; in relative terms this translates to an increase of about a third.
For welfare receipt, the estimates indicate that program participants were 9-10 percentage points more likely than previous immigrants to receive social assistance eight years after arrival; in relative terms this amounts to an increase in the probability of more than 40 percent. Note, though, that there is a negative time trend for 75/80 immigrants.
This may seem surprising, given the increase in households receiving social assistance in the first half of the 1990s (Arslanogullari, 2000) . According to Hansen and Lofstrom (1999) , immigrants in Sweden assimilate out of the welfare system; the trend in the 75/80 group may be explained by the fact that this group has spent more time in Sweden in the 87/89 period. 20 If we relate welfare receipt to natives, the program effects are smaller but still significant; see Table A3 .
Supported by Table 3 , we believe that the two comparison groups used in Table 6 capture the relevant time effects in a reasonable way. Of course, we could always eliminate the program effect by comparing with a very restricted group, with especially bad outcomes and time effects. To create a "lower bound" for the estimates, we look at the two less skilled native groups; the results are found in Table A3 . The parameter estimates are highly significant for all outcomes, although smaller when we use the group of young and less educated. Moreover, we have performed a similar operation on the main comparison groups (OECD and 75/80), where we excluded the quartile predicted to have the best outcomes; the results from these exercises are very similar to those in Table 6 .
According to the second condition of the proposition, the change in unobservable ability (cohort quality) over time must be the same among refugee immigrants and the comparison group. Can the results of Table 6 be rationalized by declining cohort quality? 21
Declining cohort quality may be a problem if the data are not sufficiently rich in terms of individual characteristics and the specification is not flexible enough. According to Borjas (2000b) , national origin is the crucial factor behind changes in cohort quality in the US.
Notice in this respect that our findings are robust to substituting the region of origin dummies with controls for country of origin. We have also interacted all individual variables with region of origin, so that e.g. the returns to education are allowed to vary between people from different regions; again, the results do not change. 22 There is no doubt that the outcomes of people subjected to the policy were worse than those of previous immigrants in absolute terms. The more difficult task is to separate the program effect from a time effect that would have changed the outcomes also in absence of the policy change. We have presented evidence that regardless of the comparison group, the program had a deteriorating effect on all outcomes. Furthermore, this holds in instances when we use comparison groups that we expect (and find) to suffer severely 20 Differing age structure is another potential explanation (if its effect is not fully captured by the linear and quadratic terms). We have experimented with regressions where data were weighted according to the age structure of the 87/89 refugee immigrants. The results are in general unaffected. 21 Nonrandom emigration of the 1975/80 immigrants could potentially be a problem. However, results in Edin et al. (2000b) show that most emigration occurs shortly after arrival. 22 We have also estimated the model separately for people from different countries. Not surprisingly there are some variations in the results; however, the negative impact of the program always remains.
during to the recession in the early 1990s. Therefore, our conclusion is that the policy change adversely affected the economic outcomes of refugee immigrants.
Effects of the placement
We now turn to investigating the effects that placement had on economic outcomes: Were people located where there were good or bad prospects? In terms of equation (5), this analysis considers the distribution component, i.e., the effect of the change in distribution over municipalities on outcomes.
The residential location after some time in the host country is not exogenous.
Therefore, our strategy is to estimate versions of the following regression for the 1987/89 cohort:
where outcome denotes either log earnings, the probability of being idle, or welfare dependency, X is a vector of individual characteristics (gender, age, age squared, marital status, level of education, region of origin, and immigration year), and ij d is a dummy variable for residing in municipality j. All variables included in equation (7) are measured eight years after immigration. To avoid bias due to sorting we instrument ij d . We instrument the dummy for the individual's current municipality with two dummies: one indicates that the individual was placed in the current municipality, the other that the individual was placed in the county block of the current municipality. The first stage equation is estimated separately for each municipality. To ensure that the municipality effects on outcomes, j γ , could be identified, and reasonably precisely estimated, we required that there should be at least 5 refugee immigrants with positive earnings in our sample that reside in municipality j; if a municipality failed this requirement it was merged with a bordering municipality. 23 We ask two questions in this part of the analysis. First, what part of the difference-indifference in outcomes originates in the change of geographic distribution? The answer to 23 Excluding municipalities resulting from splits during the relevant time period, the maximum number of municipality effects we could have estimated would have been 278. The minimum limit of at least 5 resident immigrants reduces the number of estimable municipality effects to 167. In principle, we also require that 1 assigned individual should remain in the municipality in question, otherwise the assigned municipality will have no predictive power in the first stage regression. The weight given to municipalities with few observations is relatively low; 11 percent of the sample lived in a municipality with less than 20 observations. this question gets at the distribution component of equation (5). Second, what would the effect have been if people had stayed in their assigned municipalities?
We evaluate the placement effect in the following way. Let (1) log (earnings) (2) Pr(idle) (3) Pr(welfare) (a) (b) Distribution component of difference-indifference estimate (equation (5) 
Notes:
The calculations use the difference-in-difference of distributions, with 75/80 immigrants as the comparison group. Estimates in column 1b control for regional "price" dispersion as explained in the text. Observations in 1981/83 cohort weighted to conform to the region-of-origin distribution in the 1987/89 cohort. Estimates for individual variables presented in Table A4 . The estimates for idleness and welfare receipt were obtained by applying the linear probability model. Table A4 ). For simplicity, the estimates for idleness and welfare receipt were obtained by applying the linear probability model. In column 1, we give the estimates on earnings. 24 There are two sets of estimates of the reform: column 1a has no control for regional price dispersion, while column 1b controls for the dispersion of regional house prices. The latter estimates were constructed by regressing the set of local effects ) ( γ on a vector of house prices (p).
The difference-in-difference in distributions were then applied to the transformed local effects, ) ( p α − γ (where α is the estimate from the above regression).
From the results in the first row, it seems that the distribution component accounts for a limited part of the overall effect of the policy on earnings. Without control for "prices", the estimates suggest a six percent decrease (t-ratio 1.77); with controls the estimate is positive but not significant.
For idleness and welfare it appears as if the distribution component had more of an impact; see columns (2) and (3). There is an increase in idleness of around 3 percentage points as a result of the placement policy (the t-ratio is 2.29); analogously, welfare receipt increased by 4 percentage points (t-ratio, 2.54).
Let us now turn to the second row and the comparison of initial location effects in the immigrant cohorts. Even though the standard errors are high, the estimates suggest that the initial location was associated with sizable earnings losses: had the refugees stayed on in the assigned regions their earnings would have been 39 percent (t-ratio, 1.79) lower than in the situation when they could freely chose place of residence; the estimated effect on "real" earnings is a 20 percent (t-ratio, 0.78) loss.
People were initially placed in regions with bad prospects for employment. The difference in idleness obtained when applying the initial distributions is rather dramatic.
The estimate suggests that had the refugees stayed on in the assigned municipality the probability of being idle would have been 20 percentage points higher (the t-ratio is 2.08) compared to the situation when they could freely choose place of residence.
Column 3 shows that we get a similar result for welfare. The probability of being welfare dependent was 27 percentage points higher (t-ratio 2.60) in the 87/89 cohort than in the 81/83 cohort using the initial distribution.
24 Using log earnings, of course, yields estimates that do not take behavior into account. The estimates of the impact of the reform are biased to the extent that selection affects the estimates of our location dummies. The reason for not estimating selection corrected earnings regressions is that it is difficult to come up with the exclusion restrictions necessary to produce credible estimates. Thus, there is no evidence that immigrants in general move to better regions in terms of labor market prospects, but that this was a phenomenon connected with the placement policy.
Why was the initial location bad for outcomes? In related work, we estimate the causal effects of a set of municipal characteristics on the outcomes of program participants; see Edin et al. (2000a) . We find that local unemployment has a negative effect, and that the presence of other immigrants, particularly those from the own country, influences the outcome positively. Compared to the 81/83 cohort, the 87/89 immigrants were assigned to municipalities with lower representation of immigrants and higher unemployment. When we try to explain the estimated municipal effects with observable local characteristics, it turns out that the most significant effects come from municipal unemployment (negative) and the size of the group from the own country (positive). 25 Taken together, our findings suggest that the long run effects of location on earnings, employment, and welfare receipt were relatively small. However, this is because people moved out of bad regions, not because placement created a distribution that was equal to 25 We estimated Table 8 suggests that about half of the effect on idleness came from the common component of the reform, and the other half originated in the change in distribution over municipalities. For earnings and welfare receipt, the decomposition attributes a majority of the loss to the common component. Table 6 and "Distribution" from the first row of Table 7 . "Common" is the difference between "Total" and "Distribution".
Since the estimated total and distribution effects vary between comparison groups, the decomposition is somewhat sensitive to how we make the comparison. Some experimentation with alternative comparison groups reveal that the fraction attributed to the respective components is quite stable for earnings, but varies more for idleness and welfare. If we instead use natives as comparison, the percentage attributed to the common component is larger for idleness (72%), and smaller for welfare (38%). 26 Our conclusion from this section is that the bulk of the impact of the reform came from a common effect, rather than from the change in geographic distribution induced by the placement policy. Our interpretation of this result is that the policy shift increased the initial reliance on income support as opposed to labor market policy, which had detrimental effects on people arriving under the new policy. 4.7 Is it possible to evaluate the reform?
There are two issues that could make evaluation of the reform difficult. They both relate to the unprecedented size of the inflow of refugee immigrants during the 87/89 period.
While the placement policy was in place, the annual number of residence permits issued to refugees increased from levels of 4,000-6,000 before the reform, to a peak at almost 25,000 in 1989.
The first question is whether the municipal distribution of the 81/83 cohort is an appropriate counterfactual distribution. It is possible that the increased inflow of immigrants would have changed the distribution also in absence of the reform. We try to capture this by using the difference-in-difference between the distributions. The individual's time of arrival. Admittedly, the value of this evidence is limited since there are no years with refugee immigration comparable to the late 1980s, but at least the results are not at odds with our evaluation approach.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate a Swedish reform of the refugee immigrant reception system. The reform, which was implemented in the later half of the 1980s, had two facets. First, immigrants were no longer free to choose their initial place of residence; rather they were assigned to less immigrant dense regions. Second, the reform shifted the focus away from labor market assimilation. We have focused exclusively on how refugee immigrants fared because of the reform.
We use three outcome measures: log earnings, idleness, and welfare receipt. The overall effect of the reform was detrimental to all of these outcomes. Our analysis suggests that eight years after arrival earnings were 25 percent lower because of the new policy; idleness increased by around six percentage points; and welfare receipt rose by almost 10 points.
Because there were two facets of the reform we decompose the overall effect into a common component and a distribution component. The distribution component is associated with the shift in the regional distribution of immigrants across Sweden. The decomposition analysis suggests that more than half of the total effect can be attributed to the common effect. A somewhat speculative reading of this is that the weaker link between refugee reception and integration into the labor market, and increased focus on income support, had long-lasting negative effects on individual outcomes.
The negative effects of the dispersion policy would, however, have been larger if people had stayed on in the assigned municipalities. If they would have stayed, the estimates suggest that the probability of being idle, for example, would have been 20 percentage points higher because of the placement policy. Since people moved out of the initial locations, this loss was largely undone, however. We find some indications that the effects of the distribution component of the policy can be traced to placement in regions with high unemployment and absence of ethnic networks. Tables A1a-c . The "Young and less educated natives" comparison group consists of natives aged 20-29 with no more than short high school education. "Low-skilled natives" consists of the quartile of the "Natives group" predicted to have the poorest outcomes by a regression of the outcome variable on individual characteristics. The native comparison groups have not been reweighted to conform to immigrants' geographic distribution. 
